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C
rime is always a sensitive political issue,
as politicians around the world have
found, often to their cost. They get
blamed for rising crime; they rarely get
credit when the crime rate falls. In
Britain, for example, the Blair govern-
ment is struggling to get to grips with
significant increases in the crime rate
after several years of decline. The talk is of getting tough
with criminals and making the police more effective. But is
it time to re-think the traditional approach to dealing with
crime? A growing body of research into the economics of
crime suggests that it is.
Crime keeps getting worse
Rising crime creates public alarm and sparks calls for
tough measures to deal with criminals. But while many
industrial countries have responded by pouring money into
extra policing in order to catch more criminals and then
sent more of those they catch to jail and for longer periods,
the long-term trend in most countries is a steady rise in the
crime rate, once short-term fluctuations are taken into
account. This has led some to question the efficacy of
traditional methods of dealing with crime.
Over the years, social scientists have identified a wide
range of factors which help determine criminal behaviour.
These include age, sex and the level of education as well
as family, social and cultural background. But since the first
economic analysis of crime by Gary Becker in 1968,
economists have become increasingly convinced that
economic incentives may be a crucial determinant of crimi-
nal involvement, at least in property crime. The unifying
principle of this approach is that underlying most crimes
and criminal careers there is an individual evaluating costs
and benefits. Identifying and understanding the mecha-
nisms that shape people’s criminal decisions is important
because these mechanisms hold the solutions to the crime
problem. Understanding how criminals respond to
economic incentives could therefore provide new and
useful policy tools for the fight against crime. 
The basic equation
From an individual’s point of view, a key element entering
the criminal decision must be the rate of return on illegal
activities relative to the rate of return on legitimate ones.
The expected pay-off depends on three factors: the size of
the reward (supposing the crime was successful); the
probability of being caught and convicted; and the severity
of the punishment. The opportunity cost of engaging in
criminal activity is given by the rate of return on legitimate
market activity. This depends on the wage at which the
The economics of
By Ricardo Lagos
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person could find employment; the likelihood of employ-
ment (i.e. the chances of finding a job if that person is
unemployed and of keeping it if they are employed);
income during periods of unemployment; and future job
prospects (such as expected wages and the probability of
getting and keeping a job).
Leaving aside the potential reward from criminal activity, we
would expect a negative correlation (or inverse relationship)
between the factors listed above and the crime rate. If
potential criminals do respond to the relative rate of return
from crime as determined by those variables then changes
and trends in crime rates could in turn be associated with
changes and trends in these variables. This would then
provide policymakers with a much wider range of policy
tools with which to try to combat crime. But how much
evidence is there for the link suggested?
A convincing tale
The US offers a particularly rich quarry of material. The
crime rate in America has dropped significantly over the
last 20 years: the crime rate per 100 inhabitants was 5.95
in 1980 and 5.09 in 1996. The sharpest reduction was in
the property crime rate which fell from 5.60 per 100 inhabi-
tants in 1980 to 4.65 in 1996 (a 17% fall). Recent work by
Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo and Peter Rupert (see
further reading) examined the reasons for this reduction.
They noted that between 1980 and 1996 some of the
variables we identified earlier changed significantly. For
example, spending on the police increased from 0.6% of
GDP in 1980 to 0.7% of GDP in 1996. As a result, the
proportion of property crimes that ended with an arrest
rose from 16.8% in 1980 to 18.5% in 1996, thus signifi-
cantly increasing the criminal’s chance of being caught.
Another important factor was the rise in the real wage from
$16,770 in 1980 to $18,670 in 1996 (both expressed in
1990 dollars): this represents an increase in the opportu-
nity cost of going into crime.
Detailed analysis of their findings led the authors to
conclude that the main factors responsible for the reduc-
tion in the aggregate property crime rate in the US
between 1980 and 1990 were (ranked in descending order
of importance): the increase in the likelihood of being
caught resulting from the rise in spending on the police, the
increase in the real wage and the change in the
demographic structure. 
Demographic factors are important because a large
fraction of crime in the US is committed by youths aged 18
or below. The proportion of young people in the total
population declined in the 90’s: 20.5% of the population
was between 15 and 25 in 1980, but that had fallen to
15.1% by 1996. Since youths have a higher propensity to
engage in crime, the reduction in the fraction of youths as a
result of the demographic transition contributed to the
decline in the crime rate. 
The penalties matter
Other recent research has looked at evidence of how
particular groups respond to incentives to engage in or
avoid criminal activity. Again, the role of young people in
crime is of particular interest. Although the overall crime
rate in the US has fallen over the past 20 years, the crime
rate for youths has risen significantly in the US. The youth
arrest rate for murder, for instance, rose by 177% between
1978 and 1993, while the adult arrest rate fell by 7%
throughout the same period. Similarly, the arrest rate for
The crime rate in America has dropped
significantly over the last 20 years.
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violent crimes rose by 79% for youths and by 31% for
adults between 1978 and 1993. This seems, on the face of
it, puzzling.
Steven Levitt has examined whether the different patterns
of youth and adult crime could be seen as a rational
response to changes in the likelihood and severity of
punishment for these groups. According to approximate
measures of the likelihood and severity of punishment,
Levitt argues that the severity of punishment for youths was
roughly the same as for adults in 1978 but only half as
severe in 1993. His analysis suggests that 60% of the
difference in the growth rate of crimes committed by adults
and youths can be explained by the relative change in
severity of punishment between both groups. This
suggests that youths do take account of changes in the
likelihood and severity of punishment when deciding
whether to become involved in crime. And other evidence
supports this analysis: there are sharp changes in criminal
involvement with the transition from juvenile to adult court.
Violent crimes committed by youths coming under the
jurisidiction of adult courts fell by 4% in those states where
juvenile courts are lenient relative to adult courts, but rose
by 23% in those states where juvenile courts are severe
vis-à-vis adult courts.
Wages matter too
Falling wages for young people have also played a part in
the rising figures for youth crime, according to research by
Jeffrey Grogger, who documented the relationship between
wage levels and the crime rate. He concluded that criminal
behaviour among youths is highly responsive to the poten-
tial earnings from legitimate activity. According to his calcu-
lations, a 10% wage increase would bring about a 6% to
9% reduction in criminal activity among young people.
What’s actually happened since the mid 70’s is a fall in the
real wages of young people of roughly 20% – which on
Grogger’s analysis would have resulted in a 12% to 18%
increase in their crime participation.
It’s worth noting Grogger’s conclusion that wage differ-
ences are partly responsible for the differential participation
in crime between blacks and whites in the US. It is well
known that blacks earn less than whites, even when both
have the same observable characteristics (such as age,
education, experience and type of work). In addition, police
records seem to show that in the US, blacks have a higher
propensity to participate in criminal activities. Grogger’s
analysis suggests that this is in part a labour market
phenomenon: the fact that blacks earn less than whites
accounts for a third of the difference in criminal participa-
tion between both groups.
Recent CEP research has found strong evidence from UK
data to support the idea of a negative relationship between
wages (in particular wages at lowest end of the wage
distribution) and crime.
The lessons for policymakers
There is a wealth of other evidence to support the idea that
there is a clear relationship between incentives and crime.
These “incentives” should be understood in the broadest
sense, to include the likelihood of being caught and the
severity of the punishment as well as those which explicitly
determine the costs and benefits of criminal activity. The
evidence for such relationships appears strong enough for
at least some analysts to argue that anti-crime policies
should take account of them. The positive correlation often
found between measures of income inequality and the
property crime rate, for instance, has led some economists
to suggest redistributive taxation as an anti-crime policy.
And recent work by this author and others suggests that
under some conditions, more generous unemployment
benefits can reduce the crime rate provided at the same
time punishment is sufficiently likely and severe. (If the
penal system is too lenient, increases in unemployment
benefits may have perverse effects on crime.)
Policymakers tend to address economic problems with the
economist’s toolkit and crime problems with the criminolo-
gist’s toolkit. So concerns about the welfare of the
unemployed are dealt with by proposals for more gener-
ous unemployment benefits, while rising crime leads to
calls for more police. But the fact that we know how crimi-
nals and would-be criminals react to certain economic and
other incentives opens up a whole new role for economic
anti-crime policies. When the crime rate is too high, the
policy menu consulted to remedy the situation should
include economic as well as traditional anti-crime policies.
And the optimal way to respond will almost surely include
a mix of both.
Ricardo Lagos is a member of the CEP and a Professor of
Economics at New York University.
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Time to
educate
the criminals?
Before coming to power in 1997, Prime
Minister Tony Blair promised to be tough on
crime and tough on the cause of crime. 
But as politicians gear up for the next
general election, widely expected in 2001,
the Blair government finds itself struggling
to deal with a crime wave. Figures published
in July 2000 show a rise in crime which 
has sparked new public concern about the
measures used to combat criminal activity.
In the second of our two pieces on
alternative approaches to tackling crime,
Kirstine Hansen reports on new CEP
research on the role of education.
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T
he figures make grim reading. In the year to
March 2000, crime in the UK rose by 3.8% –
5.3 million offences committed compared with
5.1 million offences in the twelve months 
to March 1999. What’s more, authoritative
sources suggest there may be widespread
under-reporting of crime – that the actual figures could 
be as much as 20% higher. The rise brought to an end 
an unprecedented period of falling crime in the years 
after 1992.
Yet the new figures are consistent with the long-term trend
in Britain (and, indeed, in most countries). Crime in
England and Wales, for instance, has on average
increased at about 5% a year since 1900; and grew even
more rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s. This long-term trend
has been remarkably impervious to changes in the criminal
justice system, prompting social scientists to explore the
underlying causes of crime and to look for fresh ways to
tackle it. Attention has begun to focus in particular on the
significance of crime committed by young people.
What do we know?
Leaving aside concerns about the possible under-reporting
of crime, we actually know quite a lot about the crimes
committed in England and Wales. In the year to March
2000, 83% of all crimes involved property: 50% of these
were thefts, 20% were thefts of and from vehicles; and 8%
were burglaries. 13% of all crimes were violent crimes; the
remaining 4% included drug offences, public order
offences and crimes involving the prevention of the course
of justice.
But the crime statistics only tell us what crimes were
reported to the police: crucially, they do not tell us who
committed the crimes. For that information we must look to
the figures relating to those found guilty of or cautioned for
indictable offences. (Since not all crimes are solved, these
figures only relate to a proportion of all crimes reported.) In
1997, there were 509,000 offenders: the vast majority –
82% – were male and about 25% were under 25. Figure 1
clearly shows that involvement in crime tends to rise and
peak in the mid to late teens and early twenties. It is the
rising level of youth crime, taking place at a time when the
proportion of young people in the population is declining
which has become the focus of much public concern and,
in turn, the efforts of policymakers.
Why the young turn to crime
In trying to combat the problem of youth crime, we first
need to establish why young people are more likely to
commit crimes. Whilst they are young most individuals
have no strong sense of self-identity; much of their behav-
iour is based on trying to achieve short-term desires.
Delinquency could simply be a way of getting ‘kicks’,
having a laugh or relieving boredom. Peer pressure may
increase delinquency as youngsters are encouraged to
prove themselves and show loyalty to their peers. At this
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Figure 1 The crime age profile of males aged 10-71, 1997
Source: Home Office
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By Kirstine Hansen
Involvement in crime
tends to rise and peak
in the mid to late teens
and early twenties.
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stage most youngsters feel little pressure to conform to
societal norms which means social controls are unable to
deter them from breaking the law. What’s more, young
people tend to be protected from harsh punishment in the
criminal justice system. This combination of factors would
seem to be a recipe for high levels of youth delinquency
and criminal activity.
But as young people grow older, they begin to be influ-
enced by a series of factors which discourage them from
breaking the law. They start to think of much delinquent
behaviour as childish. As they move from dependence to
independence, leaving school and the parental home and
entering the labour market, getting married and starting
families of their own, young people begin to develop ties to
society and attachments to social institutions such as the
family, the labour market and the community. These
factors, coupled with the possibility of more severe legal
sanctions, all encourage a lower crime rate, at least in
public, as young people move towards adulthood.
Why aren’t all young people criminals?
All this explains why on average young people are more
attracted to crime than older people. It doesn’t explain why
two people of the same age don’t display the same
propensity to become criminals – if they did, then by defini-
tion all young people would turn to crime. This has led
social scientists to explore what other factors, besides age,
are important. One key factor (though not the only one) is
of course exposure to the education system – a child’s
experience of school. New findings suggest this may play
an important role in determining the likelihood of a young
person’s involvement in crime.
A 1998 report by HM Chief Inspectorate of Prisons
showed that there were 10,570 young people under the
age of 22 in the custody of the prison services in England
and Wales in 1997. This represented a 5% increase on
the previous year. The report points out that ‘most of the
youngsters had been failed by the education system’.
Around two thirds of these youths had no formal qualifica-
tions, many had regularly played truant from school and
over 50% had been excluded (or left voluntarily) before the
age of 16.
These findings reinforce an important link between educa-
tion and offending which has been found in many empirical
studies. Take the importance of staying on at school, until
the proper leaving age. An American study in 1999 found
that high school graduation reduced criminal participation
among young males in the US, even after differences in
ability were controlled for. It also found that young male
high school graduates were 30% less likely to earn an
income from crime than those who did not graduate.
Moreover, high school graduation reduced the probability
of being arrested by around 60% and of incarceration by
between 85-95%.
The links between education and crime
Education can affect the likelihood of offending in a variety
of ways. The cynical explanation is that whilst youngsters
are at school, they are being kept off the streets. This
separates them from their most delinquent peers (who are
likely to be absent from school) and enforces some level of
discipline upon them. But there is more to it than that.
Children at school are encouraged by the idea of meritoc-
racy to have aspirations, to create goals which by working
hard at school they will be able to achieve. This encour-
ages children to develop a stake in their own future and in
society more generally. All these factors would tend to
reduce the involvement of young people in crime. 
Perhaps most importantly, though, education encourages
children to develop skills and acquire knowledge and train-
ing which will affect their future success in life. Their ability
to communicate and forge relationships, the choices they
make at the end of compulsory education, the jobs they will
do and the wages they will receive over their lifetime poten-
tially depend on the skills they acquire whilst still at school.
If children want to maximise their future success they will
be less likely to offend as youngsters. And if they secure
successful jobs with good wages as a result of their
educational success they will also be less likely to offend
as adults.
The crime-age profile
New research at the CEP has underlined the importance
played by education. We used self-reported data collected
from young men aged 16-25 in England and Wales to
examine the crime-age profiles of two groups: those who
leave school at 16 and those who stay on past the compul-
sory school leaving age. We found that the two groups
have significantly different crime-age profiles: but that the
gap between the two profiles can be accounted for by
clear differences across the two groups in a number of
Young people tend to be
protected from harsh
punishment in the criminal
justice system. 
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Figure 2 Crime-age profile by education. Basic model for property crime
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observable variables related to the labour market, educa-
tion, family, individual and the area/neighbourhood in which
the young men live. Of these, the three most important are
whether an individual lives with their parents, family contact
with the police and school truancy. These tell us a great
deal about why an individual stays on at school or not, and
the consequent likelihood of their involvement in crime.
If the age at which an individual leaves school has no link
with their involvement in criminal activity then we would
expect the crime-age profiles of the two groups to be
essentially the same. Figure 2 shows clearly that this is not
so. For those who stay on at school, criminal activity is
almost non-existent by the age of 25; for those who left
school at 16, there is no real decline in the crime rate from
the age of 22 onwards. 
Policy implications
On the face of it, these findings have important policy
implications: could obliging people to stay on at school
affect the crime rate? Unfortunately, the issue isn’t quite
so clear-cut. We need to know why these crime-age
profiles are so different in order to determine the correct
policy response. 
In order to do this, we have examined other variables which
might influence the crime-age distribution for the two
groups and controlled for them to see what impact they
have on the crime-age profiles. If any of these variables
were able to account for a significant proportion of the
difference in the crime-age distributions between the two
groups, the two distributions would become more similar. If
any or all could completely explain the difference in the
profiles then the gap would be eliminated and the two
groups would have the same crime-age profiles.
Where people live
Crime and delinquency are unevenly distributed. Evidence
from the British Crime Survey suggests that over half of all
property crime and a third of all victims of property crimes
are found in just a fifth of communities in England and
Wales. In the 1990s those in the worst crime areas
suffered twice as much property crime as anyone else in
England and Wales. The police statistics reveal similar
trends. Police force areas that include large urban conur-
bations have the highest rates of recorded crime. In the
year to March 2000 metropolitan forces recorded an
annual rise of 7.2% compared to the 0.9% recorded by
non-metropolitan forces. The greatest increases were in
the West Midlands, which saw a rise of 16%, and in 
An American study in 1999 found that
high school graduation reduced
criminal participation among young
males in the US, even after differences
in ability were controlled for. It also
found that young male high school
graduates were 30% less likely to
earn an income from crime than those
who did not graduate. 
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the Metropolitan Police area, with an increase of nearly
13%. These forces, together with the City of London,
Greater Manchester and Merseyside, recorded increases
totalling 190,000. 
Within these broad areas, crime rates are highest in inner
city areas, those with a high proportion of social housing;
and poorly maintained districts. These patterns have been
accentuated by recent trends in crime prevention and
control which have encouraged individual self-protection,
home security devices, neighbourhood watch schemes,
insurance and private policing which lead to increased
crime in poorer areas, where individuals cannot afford to
protect themselves.
It is not difficult to see that schools influence children’s
behaviour outside as well as inside the school, particularly
in relation to delinquency. The age an individual leaves
school, their attendance, whether they have been excluded
and the qualifications they gain are all differentially associ-
ated with offending.
And who they are
Empirical work has shown that a number of individual
characteristics are associated with offending. For example,
crimes rates are higher for non-whites than for white
people. According to the Home Office, 18% of the prison
population of England and Wales in 1997 were non-white
men: even though non-whites accounted for only 6% of the
total population of England and Wales. Marriage has also
been found to discourage involvement in crime. And young
people who have good relationships with their parents are
less likely to be involved in criminal activity, while those who
have run away from home are more likely to be offenders –
as are youths living away from home. 
Delinquents disproportionately come from lower class 
and low income families. Their parents, if in employment,
tend to be in low paid manual jobs. Delinquents are 
also more likely to have convicted parents or delinquent
older siblings.
Several studies have examined the link between the labour
market and crime. Although there is as yet no consensus,
many found that, at least to some extent, crime is related to
unemployment, inequality and low wages. 
Which factors matter most?
When all these factors are taken into account, the crime-
age profiles are indeed substantially altered. Figure 3
shows that the two profiles now look very similar. They
completely come together at ages 16, 24 and 25; with only
a slight gap between the two profiles from 17 to 23. All the
variables combined account for 90% of the overall gap.
0
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
0.05
0.10
0.15
Figure 3 Crime-age profiles with all variables – property crime
P
re
di
ct
ed
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
cr
im
e
Age
Those who have run away from home 
are more likely to be offenders – as are
youths living away from home. 
Did not stay on
Stayed on
CentrePiece Autumn 2000 11
Of course some of these characteristics matter more than
others. Table 1 shows that the most important set of
variables explaining the gap on average are school
variables which account for approximately 46% of the gap
overall; family variables which explain 26% of the gap; and
individual variables 27%. But we can also see from Table 1
that there are variations across ages. For example, individ-
ual variables explain very little of the gap at the younger end
of the age profile (4% of the gap at age 16), but much of
the gap between the ages of 20 and 22. This is perhaps
linked to the movement away from the parental home,
towards setting up new families and having children in the
early twenties.
Being more specific
So we know that school variables, family and individual
variables account for the largest proportion of the gap
between the profiles for those with more education and
those with less. But we would also like to know which
specific factors within these groups are most important.
And we do. At school, truancy is the most important factor.
Those who have played truant are 14 percentage points
more likely to commit property crimes. Within the family,
what’s important is whether an individual’s family has had
contact with the police: those with family members who
have had contact with the police are 19 percentage points
more likely to commit offences. And of the individual
characteristics, what matters most is whether an individual
lives with their parents at age 16. Those who do are 8
percentage points less likely to commit crimes. 
The implications for policy
There’s little doubt that these findings have important impli-
cations for long term efforts to reduce crime committed by
young people. One obvious solution might be to encourage
more young people to stay on at school – and thus hope
that young people can ‘jump’ from one crime-age profile to
the other. In fact, we do not yet know enough to know if
this would work, since we don’t know what role is played
by educational qualifications which those staying on
acquire. The other route for policymakers to explore, of
course, is in constructing social and educational policies
which can have an impact on the specific factors which
close the gap between the two crime-age profiles. 
Neither approach offers a quick fix to the problem of youth
crime. But set against a century long trend of rising crime,
the effort needed to come up with policies which can have
a long-term impact is well worth making.
Kirstine Hansen is a member of the CEP Labour Markets
programme. A more detailed account of her research in this area 
(Kirstine Hansen: The role of education, labour market and social
factors in shaping the crime-age profile CEP 2000) is available
from the CEP: www.cep.lse.ac.uk
Education encourages children to
develop skills and acquire knowledge
and training which will affect their
future success in life.
Table 1 Proportion of the gap in the crime-age profiles accounted for by the inclusion of additional variables  
Age 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mean 
Gap 0.226 0.159 0.103 0.063 0.043 0.036 0.046 0.064 .085 0.102 0.092
% explained by area/neighbourhood 10.2 11.9 15.5 17.5 17.1 8.3 0 0 1.2 6.9 9.0%
% explained by school variables 21.7 30.2 44.7 69.8 100.0 105.6 97.8 56.3 44.7 42.2 45.7%
% explained by family variables 25.2 –1.3 –34.0 –68.3 –75.6 –16.7 65.2 100.0 122.4 105.9 26.1%
% explained by individual variables 4.0 6.9 17.5 39.7 70.7 83.3 65.2 45.3 38.8 40.2 27.2%
% explained by labour market variables 11.9 10.1 0 –22.2 –58.5 –69.4 –37.0 –7.8 14.1 23.5 –1.2%
% explained by all variables 104.4 96.9 82.5 60.3 39.0 50.0 80.4 95.3 101.2 100.0 90.2%
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T
he Blair Government is understandably
concerned to increase the literacy and numer-
acy of British children. There is a growing
worldwide appreciation that education is impor-
tant in itself and also as a way of enhancing
children’s life chances and the economic
growth prospects of nations as a whole. But is the drive to
improve educational standards leading to the neglect of
other factors which can also affect employability, earnings
and economic success?
The answer seems to be yes. Take two examples. There is
now clear evidence that children with higher self-esteem at
age ten get as much of a kick to their adult earning power
as those with equivalently higher maths or reading ability.
And better performance in tests of other aspects of
psychological development are also well correlated with
reduced risk of unemployment. These are two striking
results from new research which has made use of British
data to examine how the scores of psychological and
behavioural ability at the age of ten can predict what
happens when a child grows up and enters the labour
market.
Psychological development matters
Popular demands for improving education standards are
widespread. Some people advocate the extension of the
Getting
By Leon Feinstein
Governments around the world are seized of the importance of
education both because of its importance to individuals and
because of its role in national economic welfare. But has the
emphasis on education meant that other important factors in
childhood development have been ignored? Leon Feinstein reports
on new CEP research which suggests they have.
the balance right
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school leaving age; others argue for a reduction in class
sizes. In many cases, proponents of more spending on
education believe that such investment is worthwhile
because education is a good thing in itself. But while they
might not gain such widespread popular support, similar
claims could be made about psychological development.
Self-esteem, for example, is presumably a good thing in
itself, provided that it is tempered by a realistic or balanced
view of one’s own attributes. Of course, the proponents of
higher education spending can also point to research
showing that it brings wider economic benefits. What has
been less clear until now is whether differences in individu-
als’ psychological development have similar implications for
productivity. 
Our findings reveal that they do. The early psychological
development of children has as much bearing as their
academic ability on their later productivity: so much so that
there may be grounds for arguing that school performance
should be assessed not only in terms of maths, reading or
science scores but also in terms of the success or failure in
helping children to develop in these other ways. There is as
much of an economic or investment argument for helping
children develop psychologically as there is for helping
them develop academically. Indeed, there are important
interactions between the two, and the fact that children are
failing psychologically might in many cases have negative
effects on their academic development.
Measuring psychological development
We’ve been able to track the impact of psychological
development using the 1970 British Cohort Study. This
interviewed the parents of all children born in the UK in the
first week of April 1970. Children, parents, doctors and
schools were subsequently questioned when the children
were aged 5, 10, 16, 26 and, most recently this year,
around the time of their 30th birthday. We were interested
in three sets of questions asked when the subjects of the
study were ten years old. First were standard maths and
reading tests. Next were questions known as the Lawseq
and Caroloc series developed by the Cohort Study to test
two particular psychological attributes, self-esteem and
‘locus of control.’ Both are important, well-established
notions in the psychological literature. They have been
shown to predict later adolescent outcomes such as
school performance and, when low, criminality or psychi-
atric disorder. The final set of questions was asked of the
children’s teachers and included questions relating to anti-
social behaviour, relations with peers, attentiveness and the
extent to which children were extroverted.
Self-esteem
Self-esteem is reasonably self-explanatory. The psychologi-
cal score was derived from questions such as “Do you
think that other children often say nasty things about you?”
or “Are there lots of things about yourself you would like to
change?”. Sixteen questions that were used to create a
reliable measure of self-esteem at the age of ten. Other
studies have already shown that managers perceive
workers with high self-esteem to have higher productivity in
work because they use time more effectively, requiring less
guidance and considering a wider range of solutions to
problems. Self-esteem should, therefore, increase wages
directly. It might also improve the chances of getting a job
since candidates with higher self-esteem will be more
confident in interviews and better able to sell themselves as
well as being more productive. More generally, it might be
expected that children with higher self-esteem are better
equipped both to set appropriate goals for themselves and
to achieve the goals they set. 
Self-esteem may be derived from awareness of genuine
ability. Children with higher maths scores, for example, also
have higher self-esteem. Nonetheless, there are children
with high maths or reading ability and low self-esteem. It is
what happened to these children that we focused on. Self-
esteem is strongly associated with social class. Children
from wealthier, more educated families have higher self-
esteem. We sought to compare children from families with
the same level of wealth and education. We found that in
the case of two children from families with the same low
level of income and with parents who left school at the
minimum leaving age the child with the higher self-esteem
at age ten will earn more at age 26, even if the two children
also have the same scores in maths and reading. 
The fault lies not in our stars
The locus of control is a less well-known notion. It refers to
an individual’s sense of control of their own destiny.
Individuals with a high locus of control are better able to
That children are failing
psychologically might in many
cases have negative effects on
their academic development.
Managers perceive workers with high self-esteem to have higher
productivity in work because they use time more effectively, requiring less
guidance and considering a wider range of solutions to problems. 
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process information from the outside world, are concerned
to improve both their circumstances and themselves and,
finally, are more stable in response to external influences. It
might be expected that such individuals will make better
decisions about educational and career choices and have a
higher degree of patience. Twenty questions were asked of
the children – including “When you get into an argument is
it usually the other person’s fault?” and “When someone is
very angry with you, is it impossible to make him your friend
again?” Strikingly, we found that the ‘locus of control’
score is an important predictor of female wages but is less
important for males.
Behavioural development
Assessing the significance of behavioural development –
the questions asked of teachers – is more difficult. Some
children classed as anti-social at the age of ten, for
instance, might have resolved their difficulties and score
very differently by the age of 16. It’s also important to
remember that some anti-social people earn high incomes!
Interestingly, we found that boys considered to be anti-
social at the age of ten are in general at greater risk of
unemployment in early adulthood, whereas girls who
scored similarly tend to earn more at the age of 26 than
their peers. Part of this discrepancy might be explained by
an element of subjectivity in the test answers – what teach-
ers consider to be natural aggression in boys could be
seen as anti-social behaviour in girls, for example. Or it may
be that more ambitious girls are less well accepted by their
peers and so appear anti-social. 
(It’s perhaps worth remembering at this point that these
scores are proxies for features of personality which might
be important. Our findings indicate a clear link between the
test scores at age ten and subsequent performance in the
labour market. They do not address problems associated
with the tests themselves.)
Why the family matters
Family was an important factor in performance in these
tests. The higher the level of education of the parents, the
better children performed on all the age ten tests. The
same is true for the association with social class or income.
The effects are not quite as strong for psychological scores
as they are for academic ones but they are large nonethe-
less. This link is perhaps not unexpected – but its extent is
striking. The perpetuation of social inequality through the
generations isn’t just because children from poorer families
get less education, poorer nutrition and worse housing:
they also tend to have lower internal psychological support
than children from richer families. This may make it even
harder to confront the economic circumstances of early
adulthood for which they will tend, in any case, to have less
financial or other support than children from richer homes.
Another striking finding is that while girls do better than
Boys considered to be anti-social at the 
age of ten are in general at greater risk of
unemployment in early adulthood.
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boys in the test of anti-social behaviour they have lower
self-esteem. These psychological/behavioural gender
differences are stronger than the differences in academic
abilities. The biggest gender difference is for attentiveness
at the age of ten where boys do particularly badly.
Children with good academic scores tend to score highly
on self-esteem but it is not unusual to have high academic
ability and low self-esteem. Self-esteem and locus of
control, however, are strongly correlated, although, again, a
significant proportion of children have high self-esteem and
a low locus of control score, suggesting, perhaps, that
their self-esteem is not well founded. Similarly there are
children with low self-esteem and a high locus of control
score suggesting that they have psychological attributes
that they don’t value as much as they might.
The link with the labour market
Having established that the psychological development
tests did indeed provide clear indications about how
children at the age of ten would develop in later life, we
wanted to know what the link might be with performance at
school and, more significantly, with performance in the
labour market once the children reached adulthood. It
seems clear from our findings that family influences – in
particular the wealth and educational achievements of
parents – continue to have a major influence on children’s
performance at school.
But what about in the labour market? The findings for men
and women are very different. In the case of men, those men
who only differ from each other in the degree of self-esteem
recorded at age ten will, at the age of 26, nevertheless show
significant differences in earnings. Someone with high self-
esteem at the age of ten will be earning 5.6% more than his
counterpart with low self-esteem in childhood. The same
does not hold true for women, for whom locus of control and
behavioural attributes are more important. Women who have
better peer relations at the age of ten go on to earn far more
than those with poor relations. Attentiveness and anti-social
behaviour were also significant.
The risks of unemployment are also affected. Men who
were introverted at the age of ten are more likely to experi-
ence a significant period of unemployment, as are anti-
social boys. Those boys with self-esteem who become
unemployed are less likely to experience prolonged
unemployment. For women, the results are similar to those
for wages. Attentiveness, good peer relations, locus of
control and academic ability are all important in reducing
the risk of short- or long-term unemployment.
Family-friendly policies?
It will come as no surprise to many Human Resource
professionals that people with higher self-esteem are more
productive and earn more. Neither will it shock teachers to
Family influences – in particular the wealth and educational achievements of parents
– continue to have a major influence on children’s performance at school.
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Leon Feinstein is a Lecturer in Economics at Sussex University
and an Associate of the CEP. A fuller account of these findings
can be found in CEP Discussion Paper No. 443: The relative
economic importance of academic, psychological and behavioural
attributes developed in childhood. 
know that more attentive children tend to learn more. Our
findings show conclusively that such intuitive beliefs can be
supported by empirical evidence. But are these important
psychological attributes at the age of ten randomly
allocated? Or is there scope for policymakers to influence
them? 
Perhaps the most striking of our findings was the extent to
which families rather than institutions seem to make the
difference in influencing age ten psychological and behav-
ioural scores. This has clear implications for those who
would wish to help people develop the childhood attributes
which will help them in later life. Schools are generally
large and imposing buildings where pupils are taught in
one year cohorts with classes of around 30. Schools are
necessarily geared to helping pupils achieve good key
stage and exam scores and although this requires the
development of ethical or moral attributes, they are not
institutions created to help individual children achieve
psychological growth. This has traditionally been the role of
the family.
We found that children whose fathers are in manual,
unskilled occupations have on average, low self-esteem,
low locus of control, exhibit a high degree of anti-social
behaviour and are inattentive even by age ten. Children in
this group also have worse labour market outcomes than
other children; but their difficulties are made worse by their
development up to age ten. It is not only social class of
itself that causes these outcomes, but rather what comes
with such categorisation in terms of parental education,
income, housing, schooling and family size. 
More important even than these general aspects of family
upbringing, however, is the nature of the relationships
between parents and children. In the questionnaire given to
them as part of this study, teachers were asked to make
two judgements about parental attitudes to the children:
their interest in the education of the child and whether they
exhibited any hostility to the child. Both variables are hugely
important in influencing the age ten scores. The effect of
parental hostility on self-esteem and anti-social behaviour is
overwhelming, much more important than even the
absence of a parent, the nature of the school or the
parents’ social class. 
It is also interesting that fathers’ hostility is as important in
influencing the age ten maths scores as fathers’ interest in
education. We found both to be substantially more impor-
tant than fathers’ own education or than the type of school
that the child attended. This shows how important the
psychological background of the child is in helping them
learn academic skills as well as psychological or behav-
ioural ones.
Of course, our findings don’t enable us to say anything
about the nature of this parental hostility or low level of
interest. It is possible that they are proxies for the stress of
poor material circumstances in the home, though this is
unlikely because the results already take income into
account. It is also possible that teachers don’t really
observe these parental attitudes but assume them from the
children’s behaviour. Again, this isn’t altogether a
compelling argument. The most likely explanation is that it
is the quality of the relationships formed by and with
children that help them in developing the psychological
attributes which help them achieve successful and produc-
tive economic lives.
The question for policy-makers is how to help children
develop these attributes. Clearly, policies which help
families are crucial, for example, support for parental leave,
better post-natal or subsequent health and educational
support for parents and finding new ways of involving
parents in the education of their children. Our findings
suggest that that there are economic as well as ethical
rewards for such endeavours.
Schools are generally large and
imposing buildings where pupils
are taught in one year cohorts with
classes of around 30. Schools are
necessarily geared to helping
pupils achieve good key stage and
exam scores and although this
requires the development of ethical
or moral attributes, they are not
institutions created to help
individual children achieve
psychological growth.
W
hen I was a member of
the Monetary Policy
Committee I was proud
to discover that I
received fewer column inches in
press coverage than any of my
colleagues. I had found it easiest to
behave as if I were still a civil servant,
so I gave no on-the-record interviews
and only talked (with permission) on
the usual unattributable background
basis. While this suited me fine, I am
not sure that I should have been
allowed such a quiet life.
Individual accountability
The MPC was set up with an empha-
sis on the individual accountability of
members. I took this as meaning that
not only would votes be recorded but
that members would be required to
explain their actions. They would
have to explain why they had, for
example, voted for an increase in
interest rates one month and then for
no change in a subsequent month. 
At the moment, the task of public
questioning seems to have been
delegated exclusively to the Treasury
Select Committee, which was given
special responsibilities in this regard
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
But this is not completely satisfac-
tory. The TSC only invites a subset of
the MPC. The Governor is always
included and, reasonably enough,
much of the questioning is directed
to him as a spokesman for the MPC
as a whole. In practice, only a very
small proportion of the hearings is
actually devoted to questioning of
specific decisions and, inevitably a
great deal of it is spent on attempts
to gain political points often in the,
usually fruitless, attempt to discover
disagreements between the
Governor and the Chancellor. 
The other means by which we can
attempt to discover the views of
individuals consist of the minutes of
the meetings and the quarterly
Inflation Report. When the minutes
are published, the commentators
look first at the votes and then at the
paragraphs that explain them. The
discussion uses expressions like
ÒOne view wasÉÓ, ÒOn one viewÉÓ,
ÒOn another viewÉÓ, ÒAnother view
wasÉÓ, ÒSome members of the
CommitteeÉÓ etc. Very occasionally
it is possible to attribute one of these
views to an individual member of the
Committee (e.g. when there is a
single dissenter); but usually such
attribution is impossible. We do not,
for example, know whether anyone
actually holds the view expressed or
whether it is simply there as a logical
possibility. Nor do we know whether
the views are intended to be mutually
exclusive. Sometimes the minutes
show that members were divided
over how close they were to making
a change in interest rates. This is
potentially very interesting but it
would be even more interesting if we
knew who was in which camp.
The Inflation Report is even more
problematic. The fan charts, showing
the range of possible outcomes
(within stated probability limits) are
described as representing the MPC’s
Òbest collective judgement about the
most likely path for inflation and
output, and the uncertainties
surrounding those central projec-
tions.Ó Experience has shown that
members have felt free to disagree
about the appropriate level of interest
rates while accepting (in the limited
sense) a single representation of the
fan charts for output and inflation. 
Different opinions
But we now have an additional table
which reflects a range of views on
particularly intractable issues. In the
Inflation Report of May 2000, the
issues were the future path of the
exchange rate, the extent of pass
through from earnings to prices, the
degree of improvement in supply-side
performance and the extent of
downward pressure on margins. For
example, an optimistic member of the
MPC might believe that the exchange
rate would remain constant, that
there would be weak pass-through
from earnings to prices and
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A former member of the MPC sets a challenge
for his erstwhile colleagues
More 
transparency
please!
GUEST COLUMN
In practice, only a very
small proportion of the
hearings is actually
devoted to questioning of
specific decisions.
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additional supply side improvement.
Such a combination of views would
reduce the inflation prospect at the
two-year horizon by about 1/2%
compared with the central projection.
A pessimistic member might prefer to
believe that the exchange rate would
fall in line with uncovered interest
rate parity and that there would be
weak downward pressure on prices.
That set of beliefs would add about
1/2% to inflation two years ahead. 
So if there are optimists and
pessimists, it appears that their views
on inflation two years ahead differ by
up to 1%. That is a very wide range
in policy terms, even if each view is
surrounded, as it must be, by a range
of uncertainty. But in May the MPC
agreed unanimously not to change
interest rates. There is no doubt a
very good explanation for this appar-
ent paradox. But we would at least
like to know where each member
stands on these admittedly difficult
issues. Do the options in the table
represent actual views or is the table
merely hypothetical? (But if that is
the case, why are the results not
simply included in the fan charts?)
Asking hard questions
If the Treasury Committee does not
ask these questions, why does the
press not do so? We do have the
most transparent system of monetary
policy in the world but I do not
believe we have the intended level 
of accountability.
My colleagues may feel somewhat
betrayed by my attempts to expose
them to greater scrutiny after I was
able to spend my term of office in
comfortable obscurity; but that
comfort has carried a high price. I
assumed that when I left the MPC 
I would be able to embark on a
prosperous career giving speeches
to the Annual Conference of the
Society of Fly-Posters, gala meetings
of rugby clubs, Bar Mitzvahs etc., for
enormous fees. But the invitations
have totally failed to materialise.
(Prime Speakers, where are you
when I need you? I’m much cheaper
than Lady Thatcher, and almost as
funny.) I exaggerate slightly. I gave
one lecture, into which I poured my
soul. I was rewarded by a visiting
card case and did not even receive a
thank you letter. As we economists
know, it is permanent income which
matters, so, dear members of the
MPC, suffer a little now, for the good
of the country and for your long-term
financial benefit.
Sir Alan Budd is Master of The Queen's
College Oxford. He was a member of
the Monetary Policy Committee from
1997 to 1999.
We do have the most
transparent system of
monetary policy in the
world but I do not believe
we have the intended
level of accountability.
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The right
to know:
what should employers tell their workers?
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N
egotiation does not deserve its name if one of
the negotiating parties is kept in the dark
about matters within the exclusive knowledge
of the other which are relevant to the
argument.’ Otto Kahn-Freund was writing
nearly twenty years ago: but his words still
strike a chord with those who follow the complexities of
industrial relations and collective bargaining procedures.
It’s now accepted by many management experts that
employers themselves could benefit from a freer flow of
information to employees. When pay rises are up for
negotiation, trade unions and worker representatives would
be in a much better position to assess the employment
requirements of firms and their ability to afford pay
increases. Employee relations would be improved more
widely, if worker representatives knew more about the
company’s development plans and were themselves able to
monitor skills levels, productivity, and other factors.
Yet for all the talk of partnership at work, in Britain firms
have few legal obligations to keep their workers, as
opposed to their shareholders, properly informed. In spite
of considerable changes in collective labour legislation
over the past two decades, the law on disclosure of infor-
mation for collective wage bargaining purposes has until
now remained largely unamended. Correcting this could
yet form a central part of the Blair government’s aim of
building a more positive framework for employer/
employee relations.
Leaving out the workers? 
This is not to say the legal obligations on employers have
remained completely static. In fact, the requirement to
provide information to employees has grown since the early
1970s. At that time, the emphasis was on disclosure for
collective bargaining. Then in the 1980s and 1990s there
was a new emphasis on disclosure as part of joint consul-
tation at work. This reflected a number of factors – the
predisposition of the then Conservative government,
It’s increasingly accepted that we
live in an age dominated by
information flows – the more
someone knows the better they
are able to make informed
judgements; and the person who
gets the information first often
acquires an important advantage
over others. So there are already
strict legal rules governing what a
company should tell its
shareholders – and proposals to
extend those obligations are in the
pipeline. At the same time, modern
management practices favour a
greater flow of information from a
company to its workers. But, as
the authors point out, there are as
yet few legally-binding obligations
on firms to keep their employees
properly informed about the
company for which they work.
By Howard Gospel, Graeme Lockwood and Paul Willman
‘
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growing European influence, and the preference of many
employers for information provision as part of new human
resource management strategies. 
In opposition, Labour acknowledged the need for a new
approach to industrial relations in general and to disclosure
in particular, stating before the 1997 general election that a
proper flow of information is ’fundamental to good relations
and a positive partnership between employer and
employee’. In the white paper, Fairness at Work, the
Labour government said that ’employers will in the future
have clearer obligations to inform and consult recognised
trade unions or, in their absence, other independent
employee representatives.’ The precise implications of this
were not spelt out, however. So far the government has
accepted various aspects of European social policy and
has introduced certain new rights for unions and employ-
ees. It is also reviewing the existing legislation on collective
redundancies and transfer of undertakings, both of which
contain disclosure provisions. Yet
in the Employment Relations Act
there is only one provision which
extends information disclosure,
namely in the area of training. 
This is in contrast to new propos-
als for more disclosure in
company law and for greater
freedom of information in public
life generally. In the corporate
governance area, there are also
new proposals for greater 
voluntary disclosure to sharehold-
ers, though not to other stakehold-
ers in the enterprise. And 
within management, over the 
last two decades, there has 
been a renewed interest in infor-
mation sharing, in the context of
management-sponsored or -controlled consultative commit-
tees, briefing groups, and other communications initiatives.
In the light of this activity and the promise of a new
openness, it would be a pity if the present legislative situa-
tion with regard to disclosure at work were to remain
unreformed. Where trade unions are recognised for collec-
tive bargaining, there needs to be a flow of information to
make negotiations meaningful. Moreover, if employees and
their representatives are to be in a position to negotiate
effectively on employment matters, a timely and adequate
flow of information is also essential. If social partnership is
to deserve its name, then one prerequisite is more equal
access to useful information.
The legal framework
Provision for legally-based disclosure of information for
collective bargaining was first outlined in the Labour white
paper, In Place of Strife, and was contained in its 1970
Industrial Relations Bill. Similar clauses re-appeared in the
Conservatives’ Industrial Relations Act 1971, supple-
mented by a Code of Practice and a report from the
Commission on Industrial Relations. These sections, only
marginally amended, were then re-enacted in the
Employment Protection Act of 1975 and were backed up
by a new Code of Practice from the Advisory Conciliation
and Arbitration Service (ACAS). Despite a proposal from
the Conservatives to repeal the legislation in 1991 the law
remains unamended and is now contained in the Trade
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992.
Although this Act does impose some requirements for
disclosure on employers it also provides a wide range of
exemptions.
Other legislation on information disclosure enacted in 
recent years relates either to both collective bargaining 
and joint consultation or to joint consultation alone. 
In response to European direc-
tives, employers have been obliged
to disclose information to recog-
nised unions and to employee
representatives in the event of
redundancies and business trans-
fers. In both cases, the original UK
law embodying these EU directives
had to be amended in response to
rulings by the European Court of
Justice in 1994. 
There are a number of other legal
requirements concerning disclo-
sure of information. The Health
and Safety at Work Act 1974 and
its related regulations (many
derived from European direc-
tives), gives employers a general
duty to consult safety representa-
tives concerning the promotion of health and safety. There
are disclosure obligations too in the area of occupational
pension schemes: the Pensions Act of 1995, for instance,
requires the disclosure of auditing and accounting infor-
mation. And the European Works Council (EWC) directive
(94/45/EC) also contains disclosure requirements, the
stated aim of which is to improve the right to information
and consultation of employees in enterprises operating
anywhere in the European Union.
In addition, the European Commission has proposed new
rules which would affect existing British law on disclosure.
In the first case, relating to National Works Councils, the
Commission is trying to establish an EU-wide framework
of minimum standards of information and consultation at
national level, giving employees a greater voice in the
running of companies, with or without the agreement of
employers. The UK government is opposed to these
measures, preferring instead to encourage voluntary
For all the talk of partnership at work, in Britain firms have few legal obligations
to keep their workers, as opposed to their shareholders, properly informed.
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agreements based on the notion of social partnership. The
Commission has also proposed a directive which would
establish a general framework for informing and consulting
employees in all EU countries. Information and consulta-
tion is regarded as an essential tool for employees to
adapt to organisational and work change. The
Commission argues that change is necessary because of
the weaknesses of national and EU law: where information
and consultation rights do exist at present, these are often
formal and a posteriori exercises. If the new proposals
were adopted, they would be an important step back
towards a more general approach to disclosure in UK
labour law.
The importance of the collective 
bargaining approach 
Over the years, then, a body of legislation on information
disclosure has accumulated. The core legal provisions,
however, remain those relating to
information relating to collective
bargaining; much of the responsi-
bility for implementing the rules is
handled by the Conciliation and
Arbitration Committee. It’s interest-
ing to note that the number of
cases which come before the
CAC have fluctuated markedly
over the years. Between 1976
when the disclosure provisions
first came into force and the end of
1999, the Committee had handled
476 complaints, an average of 20
per year. But the actual number in
any one year has varied consider-
ably. There was a rash of
complaints in the early years,
reflecting initial enthusiasm for the
legislation. Then the number of
cases coming before the CAC fell and remained low
through the 1980s, before rising again in the early 1990s –
and falling again in the late 1990s. 
This uneven pattern, once the novelty of the new rules had
worn off, reflected a number of factors. The decline and low
level through the 1980s, for instance, might in part have
reflected the indirect success of the provisions on voluntary
disclosure. But the fall in formal complaints might also have
reflected early disappointment with the provisions and the
fact that, from the early 1980s, the unions were too busy
dealing with the legislation of the Thatcher years. This expla-
nation might in turn be allied to the decline in the coverage
of collective bargaining in the 1980s. In these circum-
stances, the disclosure of information may not have seemed
a high priority for beleaguered union members and their
shop stewards. Trade unions may have chosen not to initi-
ate disclosure claims, either because they had other more
pressing problems or because they could not mobilise suffi-
cient workplace support around related issues.
The provisions brought together under TULRCA 1992
would seem to offer in potentia a broad set of legal rights.
Over the years, an indirect effect may have been that the
threat to use them induced employers voluntarily to disclose
information. The number of cases settled or withdrawn may
also indicate a measure of success for the CAC. But in
practice the obstacles and tests under the law are extremely
restrictive, and this is undoubtedly one reason why, after
initial enthusiasm, use of the provisions declined and
remained low before reviving again in recent years. 
What’s wrong with the existing provisions 
The provisions outlined above constitute some underpin-
ning for collective bargaining in the UK. But they also
contain elements which reduce their value to trade unions.
In the first place, information need only be provided for the
purposes of collective bargaining
as defined by the Act and disclo-
sure is limited to matters for which
the union is recognised. So claims
for information relating to costs
and prices or to organisational
restructuring where the topic had
not previously been an accepted
bargaining subject falls foul of 
the provision.
What’s more, the two tests
contained in the legislation which
might appear to strengthen a
union’s case aren’t in practice very
helpful. The first test, that of ’good
industrial relations practice’ is
vague, as the CAC itself has
admitted. The second, that of
’material impediment’ has proved
an even bigger obstacle to a union seeking to pursue a
complaint where it has managed without such information
in the past. Many employers have successfully objected
that there was no impediment and unions are severely
disadvantaged in arguing the need for information that they
do not possess. 
The CAC is also hampered because it can only adjudicate
upon a past failure to disclose and may not declare what
information the employer should disclose in the future –
even though this might help avoid a subsequent dispute.
And even in cases where the CAC rules in a union’s favour
enforcement is difficult. The CAC cannot force disclosure
of the information required, nor can it include a punitive
element in the award against an employer.
A different approach?
It’s clear that the tests and exemptions contained in the
Trade unions may have chosen not to initiate disclosure claims, either because they had other
more pressing problems or because they could not mobilise sufficient workplace support.
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1992 Act are extensive and restrictive. They inhibit union
claims for information and provide employers with a wide
range of arguments against disclosure. So does the more
recent legislation covering disclosure in specific areas
combined with the new proposals coming out of Brussels
offer an alternative approach?
Not as much as unions might have hoped. Although some
of the weaknesses of the 1995 provisions relating to
collective redundancies have been addressed in the
changes made by the new government in 1999, not all of
them have been remedied. Employers are still only obliged
to consult workers about redundancies in good time and
not at the earliest opportunity. And the government did not
remove the exemption for redundancies affecting fewer
than 20 workers. There are similar shortcomings in the
specific disclosure requirements relating to business trans-
fers and pensions. Even the Health and Safety at Work Act
of 1974, while bringing many benefits in terms of improved
practices, was weak in enforcing disclosure of information;
and smaller, non-union firms are often unaffected.
What is to be done?
There is a continuing tension in the UK between the tradi-
tional approach to disclosure and employee representation
based on collective bargaining and the alternative approach
to information and consultation rights derived in part from
European Union initiatives. Indeed, there is a possibility that
the one may displace the other, and the two approaches
are often portrayed as dichotomous. In practice, unions
may view the two approaches as complementary and seek
to utilise both to produce a comprehensive framework of
information, bargaining, and consultation rights for employ-
ees and their representatives. 
There are nevertheless important analytical differences
between the UK law on disclosure for collective bargaining
and the European-influenced provisions. The disclosure
provisions in UK law are auxiliary in nature, in that they are
intended to support the collective bargaining process. But
the nature of the provisions – such as their restriction to
recognised unions – makes it clear that they aren’t meant
to extend the coverage or scope of collective bargaining.
In fact, the UK provisions constitute an agenda-driven
disclosure model; i.e. the trigger for their use lies within the
bargaining agenda. By contrast, the provisions ultimately
stemming from European directives are event-driven; they
are triggered by specific employer-initiated events which
affect employment contracts in many ways irrespective of
the representative context. Whereas the concern of the
The right to information could be made more extensive, especially in the areas of non-labour
costs, financial matters, the state of the organisation, and corporate strategy. 
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former is with the vitality of a process, the concern of the
latter is primarily procedural justice in the operation or
termination of employment contracts. As we have shown,
the latter operate in a palliative rather than preventative
way, and they need have no continuous impact on bargain-
ing relationships. Their main advantage, however, lies in the
absence of any necessary association with collective
bargaining processes which are shrinking in coverage.
The potential strength of disclosure for collective bargain-
ing is that trade unions have the organisational capability to
use information in that they are continuous associations,
with a real independence of the employer and with exper-
tise and resources beyond the workplace. Given the
shrinkage of collective bargaining and the growth of non-
union workplaces, however, disclosure for consultation has
become more important in recent years. The legal frame-
work should aim to provide good disclosure for collective
bargaining wherever possible; where this is not possible,
there is a need for the provision of good information for
joint consultation. To this end, the TULRCA 1992 provi-
sions for disclosure need to be improved along with better
information provision for joint consultation. 
Proposals for change
Several reforms suggest themselves. The right to informa-
tion could be made more extensive, especially in the areas
of non-labour costs, financial matters, the state of the
organisation, and corporate strategy. The statutory restric-
tions on disclosure could also be more narrowly defined.
The timing of disclosure is crucial, and here employers
might be placed under a duty to provide information ’as
soon as possible’. Good disclosure practice requires more
positive employer action and the role of legislation should
be the promotion of such a development. Against this
standard, it would seem the present law is inadequate. The
’substantial injury’ and other safeguards cast the employer
as a reluctant divulger of secrets rather than an active
participant in information transmission and social partner-
ship at work. 
So it would seem to be in the interests of unions to press
for changes in the law based on a wider notion of the area
of collective bargaining, together with a more effective
enforcement mechanism, but without the stringent
safeguards concerning confidentiality, substantial injury,
production of documents, and disproportionate work. For
deliberate breaches of the obligation to disclose, the law
could impose financial penalties on recalcitrant employers
and CAC declarations might be made enforceable in the
courts. And the ACAS Code of Practice should be
reviewed so that the code gives better guidance on the
general principle of ’good industrial relations’ practice. 
The law on disclosure for consultation also has a number of
weaknesses. It is disclosure for very specific purposes; it is
not always easy to make linkages, say between information
on a business transfer and the underlying commercial
factors which gave rise to the strategic decision; and it is
disclosure to representatives who do not usually have the
organisational capability and independence which unions
possess. Yet given the shrinkage of collective bargaining,
disclosure for consultation has become more important in
recent years. It would certainly be wrong, therefore, to
throw the baby out with the bath water and to argue against
strengthening of the law in this area. At the very least, the
existing European disclosure requirements connected with
collective redundancies and business transfers should be
fully implemented in the UK. In these and other areas, such
as pensions and health and safety, greater consistency and
improvements could be made in terms of the timing of
disclosure and the nature of information provided. 
In this respect also, rather than rejecting the concept of
national works councils, the government should adopt the
initiative and make it a central forum for meaningful informa-
tion disclosure. Worker representatives and trade unions
need to be given sufficiently detailed information at the
earliest opportunity if they are to be effectively involved in
decisions at work. In the UK context, it is then to be hoped
that, in a more supportive legal environment, such provi-
sions might both give strength to, and derive strength from,
trade unions along German lines.
The benefits of change
Improvements to disclosure of information for collective
bargaining and joint consultation could have significant
benefits for employee relations. Trade unions and worker
representatives would be in a better position to assess the
employment requirements of firms and their ability to afford
pay increases. They would be better placed to assess
development plans, to monitor skill levels and productive
efficiency, and to ensure that management is best exploiting
commercial opportunities. Information is of particular impor-
tance in the rapidly changing and competitive environment
within which organisations now operate. The neglected area
of disclosure of information could be a central part in the
Labour government’s aim to build a more positive system of
employee relations. Otto Kahn Freund’s observation applies
not only to information for effective collective bargaining, but
also to information for meaningful consultation or any real
notion of social partnership at work. 
Howard Gospel is Professor of Management at King’s 
College, London.
Graeme Lockwood teaches at King’s College, London. 
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Gospel and Willman are members of the CEP Labour 
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Representatives and trade unions need to be given sufficiently detailed information at the
earliest opportunity if they are to be effectively involved in decisions at work.
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S
ince the collapse of the communist
regime in Russia, several members of the
CEP, in particular Richard Layard, Amos
Witztum and myself have been involved
in one way or another with the restructur-
ing of economics teaching in Russian
universities. Evidently, the abandonment
of Marxist ideology, the ending of the
planned economy and the opening up of Russia to the
international community necessitate far-reaching changes
in its education system. The teaching of many subjects,
including history and philosophy, but above all economics,
needs to be radically reformed in the light of the new order.
The syllabus of an economics degree which enables
students to understand how a market economy works will
Reform in
The Centre for Economic
Performance has been intimately
involved in the restructuring of
economics teaching in Russian
universities. Richard Jackman
explains the difficulties he and
his colleagues encountered – 
and how reform was set in train.
Russia
A good news story
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by Richard Jackman 
obviously be totally different from one appropriate to a
planned economy. But in our experience changes in the
substance of what is taught have been, in a way, the easy
part; more fundamental are changes in the way in which
subjects like economics are taught, which in turn reflect
very basic ideas about the purpose of education and its
role in society. 
A lingering legacy
Since the early 1980s, various international organisations
such as the World Bank, the European Commission, the
Soros Foundation, and, in Britain, the Know How Fund,
have provided technical assistance to economics depart-
ments in universities throughout Eastern Europe and in
Russia, to enable them to reform their curricula and retrain
their teachers. New colleges have been set up and new
programmes instituted. It might be thought, ten years after
the fall of the Berlin Wall, that substantial progress would
by now have been made in introducing courses in conven-
tional Western market economics in Russia. In reality,
Russian universities have proved remarkably impervious to
Western influence, and most Russian students continue to
be taught a Marxist-based curriculum which has hardly
changed over the last twenty years.
The reason for this failure is, we believe, that most Western
institutions, and indeed individuals, did not fully appreciate
the extent of differences between the education system of
the former Soviet Union and that of Western countries. The
idea that Russian economists could simply be retrained to
teach neo-classical economics, in the same way as an
international trade theorist could learn how to teach, say,
competition policy, was fundamentally misguided. It was to
assume Russian economists had been studying their
subject by the formulation and testing of hypotheses about
the behaviour of planned economies, rather than by the
learning of the classic texts of Marxism-Leninism as the
fundamental truth about economics. 
The extent of the problems…
At the outset there were indications of peculiarities in the
Russian education system. Russian students brought over
to the West in the early days were evidently, and indeed
quite openly, cheating in exams. Linked to this, teachers
reported students outraged if they were not told the exami-
nation questions in advance. One might observe similar
disparities in formal teaching. Go to a lecture in a Russian
university. A teacher might be elaborating a complex mathe-
matical proof on the board; his class might be sitting
around paying no attention but reading the newspaper,
playing chess or chatting to one another. 
The pervasive malaise of the Russian economy, which is
that firms were encouraged to meet output targets through
the real or fictitious production of goods which no-one
wanted, the ‘we pretend to work and they pretend to pay
us’ syndrome, seems to have afflicted the universities also.
The students pretended to study and were rewarded with
meaningless qualifications, but as long as all the students
got their degrees each year the system was seen to be
working successfully. Teaching became an opportunity for
teachers to demonstrate their intellectual prowess and
proceeded without regard to whether or not the students
were learning anything. (Such tendencies are, of course,
not unknown in other parts of the world also.) Russian
exams have until very recently been oral rather than written.
As long as exams were oral everyone could pass; written
exams are more of a problem but the rational response in
the context of the system is to coach students in the
specific questions that will be asked, and, if they still can’t
manage, to condone cheating in the exam itself.
…and the struggle to overcome them
Thus attempts to ‘teach’ Western economics have initially
sometimes involved simply the application of rote learning,
which was the basic skill developed under the previous
regime to Western textbooks. The new market-orientated
courses were very often taught in addition to rather than in
place of the Marxist and planned economy courses left
Most Western institutions, and indeed
individuals, did not fully appreciate the
extent of differences between the
education system of the former Soviet
Union and that of Western countries. 
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over from the previous regime. For example, at Moscow
State University, which was in receipt of a substantial grant
from the EU through the TEMPUS TACIS programme,
which was run by CEP, at no stage did the new courses
comprise more than 10% of a student’s total teaching.
They were therefore able to offer only a glimpse of market
economics rather than giving students any real understand-
ing of the subject. In part, of course the resistance to
change represents the entrenched positions of senior
academics, whose courses would need to be terminated to
make way for the new subjects.
The malaise in the existing system led us to the view that
the only way to achieve radical reform was through the
introduction of degrees subject to external examination.
Thus, in 1997, Richard Layard, Director of the CEP,
together with a group of Russian academics, set up the
International College of Economics and Finance (ICEF).
This college had the financial support of a consortium of
Russian banks, and was officially sponsored by LSE and
the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, with an
academic support programme run by CEP. To ensure that
the College actually did provide an education equivalent to
that of a Western university, the students sit the University
of London examinations for external students.
The shock of the new
Exposure to external Western examinations has had a
traumatic impact. In the first year, completely unexpect-
edly, about two-thirds of the students passed in econom-
ics but only one-third in calculus and only one-sixth in
statistics. Given that economics is a completely new and
unfamiliar subject, taught in a foreign language and
examined in the context of a foreign culture and institu-
tions, while on the other hand Russian students are
believed to be good at mathematics, and the subject
matter of mathematics can hardly differ very greatly 
from on part of the world to another, better results in
economics came as a shock both to ourselves and to the
teachers in Russia.
The key difference as we see it is that the economics
courses, precisely because we had been very worried
about the students’ prospects in this subject, had been
taught by teachers who were themselves Western
educated or had familiarity with teaching in the West. By
contrast, we assumed that Russian teachers of mathemat-
ics would be perfectly competent to teach their subject for
Western examinations even if they had themselves no
experience of study or teaching in the West. Unhappily, it
turned out that for the reasons we have already described,
the Russian teachers had no idea of how to teach the
acquisition of basic mathematical skills at the level
required to pass elementary Western examinations. In the
second year of the College, we invited an English gradu-
ate of mathematics who was at the time working in
Moscow to assist with the College’s teaching, and this,
together with a number of similar initiatives, raised the
pass rate in calculus from one-third to over 80%. 
Defining the differences
So what are the differences between teaching methods in
Russian and Western universities? The fundamental one is
that in Russia, education is seen as a one-way process in
which teachers speak and students listen. The typical
Russian academic week consists of 40 hours of lectures,
and the students are not expected to do more than listen
and attempt to absorb the content of the lectures. There
are no classes, seminars or discussions, nor are the
students expected to write essays, or solve problems or
exercises. Students in other words are not given any
opportunity or encouragement to think for themselves. This
authoritarian approach to education is clearly consistent
with Marxist ideology, though it derives historically from the
French and German eighteenth century practice of accord-
ing respect to intellectual authority, as against the Anglo-
Saxon empirical tradition.
The students pretended to study and were
rewarded with meaningless qualifications,
but as long as all the students got their
degrees each year the system was seen 
to be working successfully. 
One test is that of the market-place, the objective of education being
then to produce graduates with the most marketable skills. 
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But if cultural traditions differ across countries can there be
any justification for seeking to impose an approach to
economics based on one particular culture on to universi-
ties in a country whose cultural traditions are different? Is
there any sense in which the Anglo-Saxon tradition is not
simply different, but better? One test is that of the market-
place, the objective of education being then to produce
graduates with the most marketable skills. One would hope
not, but equally it is not irrelevant that economics graduates
from good Western universities are able to command high
salaries, whereas those with Russian degrees are not. Why
should there be a commercial pay-off from the study of an
essentially academic discipline like economics?
Nurturing independence of thought
We would argue that economics as taught in leading
Western universities provides a means of thinking about
economic problems, or a language of enquiry. Its objective
is to enable a student to think for themselves about an
economic problem. It is therefore necessary first to demon-
strate to students the tools of economic analysis and then
provide them with the opportunity to practice the use of
these tools, first in the context of relatively simple and artifi-
cial problems (exercises) and then in application to more
complex real world problems (in essays). The ‘core’
courses of theoretical economics and econometrics,
supported by mathematics and statistics, provide students
with the tools they need for this purpose, and the emphasis
on solving problems on their own gives them the opportu-
nity to practice using them. The ‘core’ subjects are thus
central to the study of economics in Western universities.
The purpose of applied subjects is rather different. It is to
build a bridge between abstraction and reality, by demon-
strating the relevance and application of theoretical
concepts and/or econometric methods within a specific
area. The purpose is not to learn a lot of facts about some
feature of the economic landscape like say international
trade or the financial system, but rather to use economics
to gain a better understanding of key issues in one or other
of these areas. The application of theory and empirical
techniques will often strengthen a student’s understanding
of them, and learning how to apply economics in one area
will teach a student how to apply it to other issues also.
Students are examined by unseen written papers, anony-
mously marked and externally moderated. The exam
questions are designed to test the student’s capacity to
analyse a new problem without external assistance. For this
reason the exam papers are kept secret and students can
be punished for cheating. The coursework where students
were solving problems on their own thus provides prepara-
tion for what is required in the exams. The degree struc-
ture, teaching method and method of examination thus
constitute a coherent package, embodying an approach to
economics as a method of thinking, rather than a means of
acquisition of specific knowledge.
The success of the well-educated economics graduate lies
not in the subject matter they have been taught but in the
intellectual capacities which they have acquired. The
capacity for abstract thought encourages the mental flexi-
bility required to tackle new problems and develop new
ideas. Such skills are valuable and particularly so in
economies subject to rapid change. In Russia, the radical
restructuring of the education system necessary to enable
its students to succeed in the world is still at a beginning,
but with motivation and appropriate institutional reforms,
the prospects for the longer term remain bright. 
Richard Jackman is a member of the CEP Labour Markets
programme and Professor of Economics at the LSE.
In Russia, education is
seen as a one way
process in which
teachers speak and
students listen. 
We would argue that economics as taught in leading Western universities provides a
means of thinking about economic problems, or a language of enquiry. 
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The Centre’s tenth birthday
I
n May, the Centre for Economic
Performance celebrated its tenth
anniversary. To mark the occasion,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Gordon Brown, delivered the
second James Meade Memorial
Lecture to an audience of nearly a
thousand in the LSE’s Peacock
Theatre. Anthony Giddens, Director of
the LSE, was in the chair. 
Mr Brown paid tribute to the work of
the Centre, noting the impact which
many of its research findings had had
on contemporary economic thinking.
After the lecture, several hundred
guests adjourned to the Shaw Library
for the Centre’s birthday party.
Former members of the Centre, many
of its longstanding supporters,
journalists and policymakers were
among those who heard Director
Richard Layard speak about the
Centre’s past – and its future.
Professor Layard listed some of the
main achievements of the Centre
during its first ten years: the work on
unemployment which had led to the
British government’s New Deal policy;
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the work on issues such as workless
households; and the Centre’s
involvement in Russia since the
collapse of the USSR. 
He then announced that negotiations
with the ESRC for a further five years
of core funding had been successfully
concluded, securing the Centre’s
future until at least 2005.
Chairman of the CEP Policy
Committee, Adair Turner, also spoke.
He noted that the Centre would in the
future be increasingly obliged to
supplement its core funding from
outside sources and announced the
start of a major funding drive by
inviting those present to consider
ways in which they might help provide
financial support to the CEP.
May also saw the launch of
CentrePiece’s new website – 
www.centrepiece-magazine.com 
Check it out!
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